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TAGS AND FOLKSONOMIES AS ARTEFACTS  
OF MEANING 
ALEXANDRE MONNIN 
 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
   The advent of the so-called Web 2.0 and the Semantic Web, for all 
their seemingly apparent (Floridi, 2009) differences, was instrumental in a 
renewed interest in questions that used to be addressed solely by the 
philosophy of language. Amongst these, the problem of meaning is 
paramount to many a Webservice. The fact that philosophical 
problematiques of such a magnitude as this one are brought up both in the 
design process and effective use of technical devices, forces us to realize 
that some topics are already moving from the traditional realm of 
theoretical questions to an area packed with innumerable “artefacts of 
meaning” - tagging systems among many (we will focus on these for the 
time being).  
   This shift, that we’ve chosen to dub “artefactualization” elsewhere 
(Monnin, 2009a), bespeaks the now common coupling between 
philosophical questions and technological realities. In other words, a 
process that exhibits continuity as well as radical change and deeply 
subverts established views about the relationships symbolic forms and 
artefacts entertain with one another.  
 
* 
 
   In this paper, we try to give a characterization of tags, drawing from 
previous work accomplished in the wake of the Semantic Web “identity 
crisis” and at the same time with regards to keywords, descriptors, and 
other lexical components found in library sciences in order to dispel 
widespread confusion on these matters. Eventually we show that the 
meaning of a tag is not a question that can be restrained either to its 
technological or symbolic dimensions. 
Tags and Folksonomies as Artefacts of Meaning 
 
 
216 
2. Tags: Material Props and Labels,  
between Access & Reference 
2.1. The Three Canonical Dimensions  
and the Access/Reference Duality 
    
In his initial definition of folksonomies, Thomas Vander Wal was keen 
to underline their dependence on tags, thus observing the latter’s precedence: 
 
Folksonomy is the result of personal free tagging of information and 
objects (…) for one's own retrieval. The tagging is done in a social 
environment (usually [my emphasis] shared and open to others). 
Folksonomy is created from the act of tagging by the person consuming the 
information. (Vander Wal, 2007) 
 
 Indeed, two years had to pass after the creation of Muxway, the first 
self-proclaimed tagging system, for the coinage of the word 
“folksonomies” to happen. Since then, the lack of a proper characterization 
of tags has consistently remained conspicuous. Research eagerly followed 
the trail of folksonomies, understood as a collaborative phenomenon, in 
the hope of leveraging users’ contributions on a large scale (also known as 
crowdsourcing), rather that foundational trends. It is also to be 
acknowledged that the topic remains quite laden with confusion mainly 
due to the constant equivocation between the recurring and holdall notion 
of keyword, descriptors pertaining to documentary languages, natural 
language words used to launch search engines’ queries, HTML <meta> 
“tags” embedded in Webpages and, strictly speaking, tags. Hence, the 
existing vocabulary in library sciences no doubt acted as a serious 
hindrance which prevented any clear-sighted depiction of the main issues 
at stake in this debate for a relatively long time. To draw such a depiction 
with accuracy, it is necessary to focus our attention on the ever-changing 
technological context which saw the emergence of tagging systems. Only 
if this condition is fulfilled will it become possible to bring the “symbolic” 
dimension of tags to fore and show how inescapably it is intertwined with 
complementary technical aspects. Symbolic is here to be understood as a 
broadly encompassing term. We have to acknowledge the influence of 
Belgian philosopher of technology Gilbert Hottois’ thought, which 
contrasts “symbolicity” and technology – yet we also try hard not to 
underestimate the symbolic activity of technosciences. For Hottois, it is on 
a level of its own as evidenced in this excerpt, strikingly reminiscent of the 
Semantic Web:  
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Le langage des technosciences se veut purement objectif. En termes 
logiques, ce devrait être un langage purement extensionnel ou référentiel, 
dépourvu de toute étendue de sens. Un langage qui étiquette le réel afin 
d’offrir des prises et de permettre l’organisation collective des relations 
opératoires [my emphasis] – techniques, mathématiques – au réel. Un tel 
étiquetage est conventionnel et instrumental : ses mots n’apportent rien – 
ni sens ni supplément de maîtrise – à la maîtrise technomathématique des 
objets, des opérations et des processus qu’ils désignent. (Hottois, 1996, 91) 
 
We thus go as far as to temporarily subsume, under the word 
« symbolic », iconic representations as well as linguistic signifiers.  
 
While no canonical definition of tags is available on the academic 
market, thanks to early (Newman, 2005a) attempts to model tags with such 
ontological web languages as RDF and OWL, tag ontologies do however 
exist. The reifications they afford will temporarily palliate the lack of 
genuine definitions and provide this investigation with a commonly shared 
starting point – albeit an ontological one which may sound a bit ironic 
considering how much publicity the alleged opposition between ontologies 
and folksonomies has received (Shirky).  (Wikipedia gives the clearest 
imaginable definition of reification: “making a data model for a previously 
abstract concept”.) 
 
Newman’s tag ontology (the same is also true of Thomas Gruber’s 
TagOntology from 2005) aims to describe a single tagging process by 
distinguishing between:  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. – The three axis of Newman’s tag reification 
A 
user 
The tag 
 itself 
A resource 
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 For all its limitations, a quick survey would nevertheless show that 
such a threefold division is barely challenged by any alternative. With the 
ensuing risk of obfuscating the dual nature of tags: as much material 
devices (an echo of the concrete nature of the object after which they were 
named) as symbolic ones. To conflate the two aspects is tantamount to 
overlooking the simple fact that symbolic bonds between words and things 
do not in the least require to be technically implemented in any way. No 
technical apparatus is necessary for a word to point to an object, no 
artefact will ever make up for this possibility; in other words, reference 
pertains to the domain of semantics (or pragmatics, thereof - though the 
question remains open as to whether or not others factors can affect it – cf. 
infra). On the other hand, every tagging system is implemented according 
to the rules dictated by the needs of the website it serves (who’s allowed to 
tag? what? how? etc.). Reference is thus de facto complemented on 
another level by the association, on the technical side of things (the 
Internet being a physical network were information is exchanged, this 
should not come out as a surprise), of a tag with a resource. (The word 
“resource” is here used in the technical sense it has received from the 
W3C. A resource thus understood can be anything. Cf. infra §3.3.) 
 
Its ins and outs concern interfaces informational design and the 
tangible realities of networks and protocols - especially the Web 
architecture centred around the HTTP protocol (RFC 2616, 1999) and 
URIs (RFC 3986, 2005). “Access” is the name Patrick Hayes (2006) has 
given to this relationship in the ongoing debate about the “identity crisis” 
faced by the semantic Web (Halpin, 2006). He convincingly underlines the 
necessity to carefully dissociate the two dimensions in his discussion of 
URIs. Our main assumption is that it is essential to reckon what this 
discussion revealed, and transpose its result to our endeavour to 
characterize tags in a twofold fashion; first, as words, or rather potentially 
meaningful strings of characters; then as a « material » reality granting 
access to a resource and tightly constrained through limitations attributable 
to the computerized systems it belongs to (be it the Web or a local 
application like Photo Gallery on Microsoft Vista OS – cf. infra). 
 
Deprived of this distinction, Newman’s endeavour raises serious 
issues. First and foremost, such an ontology’s worth has to be evaluated 
with regards to what it makes more explicit as much as what it obfuscates. 
Any description of tags revolving around the same three axes without 
showing any concern to the complexities of interfaces would seem at best 
questionable. Yet, once implemented, it will provide an “adequate” means 
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to achieve (or rather prescribe) interoperability between miscellaneous 
tagging Webservices, thus giving birth to a unified conception of tags 
without any room left for second thought. 
Computer ontologies serve not only to describe reality but rather as 
tools to build knowledge systems around a given set of representations. 
Belonging to the same technical realm as the entities they model – at least 
in the digital context of the current discussion, one simply cannot confuse 
them with “mere words” wholly deprived of technological efficiency; a 
good reason to show special care and dedication towards the objects being 
modelled.  
2.2. From Tags to Machine-Tags:  
Blank Spaces, Labels and Material Tags 
Access relationships differ from reference inasmuch as the former are 
altogether causal in nature, therefore material, and relate users and 
resources through a relation of ostension. Ostension as philosophers have 
noticed, in particular since Wittgenstein (1953), inescapably points to its 
objects in an indeterminate fashion, or, to update our description in a way 
that better suits the current realities behind the Web, to the resource it 
designates.  
It could be argued that causality is (obviously) central to causal 
theories of reference, which would undermine the distinction we’re trying 
to draw. However, whereas in causal theories ostension plays a major role, 
they also tend to rely on naming conventions reintroducing, as a result, an 
element that escapes causal reduction. As Hayes puts it:  
 
“reference to accessible entities still differs from access. Establishing 
reference by ostension requires naming conventions”. (Hayes, 2006) 
 
The label itself is nothing more than the string of characters inscribed 
on the tag – construed as a material support and artefact belonging to an 
informational network. While contriving access to a resource (informational 
or not, cf. infra), this prop also allows users to add any required bit of 
texts. It thence becomes possible to index, evaluate, share or find again 
objects that previously overstepped the customary limits of annotation. 
This is precisely what the traditional post-it – a material device by all 
account – offers: a blank inscribable surface attachable on other 
(supposedly) non-inscribable surfaces. To put it bluntly: annotations where 
it used to be lacking. For instance, the software « Time Line », developed 
in France by the IRI (see bibliography), makes it possible to set apart and 
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annotate movie sequences at will with tags (a feature also found on 
Yahoo’s recent VideoTagGame (SANDBOX, see bibliography) with an 
emphasis on collaboration typical of GWAPs, games with a purpose).  
Another manifestation of the wide dissemination of ad hoc apparatus 
supporting input of meta-data by users would be Window Vista Gallery 
(Smith, 2008, 197-201). The main feature it offers is the possibility to tag 
photos on a local machine not simply by tying together a tag and a digital 
resource but rather by injecting the tag into the said resource. Contrary to 
post-its, often used as mere reminders with no guarantee that they won’t 
get lost themselves, Gallery keeps track of every tag in the system to 
secure lasting access to all marked resources. The rationale behind it is no 
longer akin to that of shortcuts for it is well-known that whenever the 
target of a shortcut is moved to another directory the shortcut will still 
point to the same direction and miss the mark. Incorporating tags inside 
resources, provided tags are traceable without fail, will make the former 
impossible to lose – just as tags themselves. Hence both tags and tagged 
resources happen to form a new whole, sharing the properties of its parts, 
including infallible traceability.   
 
Nothing, as betokens the analogy with paper tags, constrains users to 
write down strings of characters that necessarily take the shape of words – 
let alone lemmatised ones (whatever the syntactic constrains each tagging 
system tries to enforce on its users; for instance tags may be separated by 
either by spaces or commas). It follows therefore that it is simply not 
desirable to roughly equate tags with any known linguistic form. The 
reality is infinitely more complex than the previous schema would let us 
assume, for the reason that the status of the “tag” entity in Newman’s 
ontology isn’t critically addressed. However, it is not so much advisable 
either to get rid of a threefold partition, which has done much to help 
operationalize tags by adding relevant handleable ontological attributes 
(the choice of every facet is left upon the user; see Monnin (2009c) for a 
brief historical reminder), than to expand it by introducing more 
complexity. Namely, the already mentioned distinction between the 
material reality pointing to a resource (or rather, the representation of a 
resource, as we shall see) thanks to their common belonging to a given 
technical network, and a semiotic and linguistic relationship carried out 
through items that eventually boil down to strings of characters. 
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Fig. 2. – The twofold nature of tags. 
    
   Thanks to the freedom characteristic of what we chose to call an 
“inscribable space”, it is even possible to mix these two dimensions. 
Actually, Flickr’s machine tags do just that. As a lightweight way to bring 
more structure to users contents, they articulate three dimensions (actually 
this is where they first got their name: triple tags): 
 
namespace:predicate=value 
 
Breaking data following this pattern allows Flickr teams to send the 
“facets” (as in “facet classifications”) of a machine tag to a database where 
they can be queried through the website API. In this way people are 
offered the opportunity to formulate any query starting from a given 
namespace, a predicate and a value or any number of combinations of the 
three. 
These tags provide a borderline case which nevertheless illustrates the 
relevance of the access/reference duality integral to the model depicted in 
Figure 2. Historically, two possibilities make themselves available.  
Either machine tags will be treated as mere triple tags. Triple tags used 
to be labels written according to the above schematization: their syntax 
heavily influenced by the XML family of languages, microformats and the 
spread of RDF graph-like models, provided users with an effective and 
low-cost way to express complex relationships with only one label. The 
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latter, once embedded in a URL would then give rise to a tag that would in 
turn give access to any dereferenceable resource on the WWW.  
Or (a possibility not incompatible with the previous one as we will 
see), they no longer need to be associated to a URL. Their parsable syntax 
made them sufficient to grant access to information resources by way of 
queries launched through APIs of websites like Flickr where triple tags, 
once used as mere symbolic tools, became machine-readable; that is, 
where triple tags can be used as machine tags (thus bringing the 
access/reference duality at the very level of the label itself).“For the 
moment, machine tags are principally an API "thing"” (FLICKR). Such a 
conclusion could even be generalized to any term that is part of a query 
made on a search engine. 
 
Since no explicit rules require that labels should be limited to words or 
specific human-readable signs, nothing prevents using computer code 
either. Even more so since, as vague a syntax as the one people used 
simply as a means of abbreviation, gave birth to a new microformat on its 
own as soon as machines were programmed to “interpret” it the right way. 
Although extremely crude, from the proto-syntax it used to be, it 
nonetheless became ipso facto a legitimate computer syntax. From this 
angle, machine tags are the logical product of a tendency that leverages the 
fundamental duality of tags.  
3. Which Semantics for Labels? 
A striking feature in the debate surrounding the status of tags 
undoubtedly is how often they are put on a par with keywords without 
further ado. For that reason, it is a pressing necessity to give precise 
definitions of those notions borrowed from library sciences to which they 
are repeatedly assimilated. Otherwise, there would be a high risk of 
obfuscating every attempt to clarify questions related to the semantics of 
labels (and not, properly speaking, of tags).  
Joshua Schacter’s comment on Wikipedia discussion page:  
 
“While keywords are not new, I believe that tagging is a larger concept 
than just assigning keywords to things, however - I feel that it also includes 
the retrieval of the set of used terms/keywords/whatever upon view of the 
items. Additionally, I am reasonably sure that I named this.” (Schacter) 
 
Given their conventional nature, lexical entities in documentary 
languages are very well defined (at least compared to other lexical 
components like words whose nature may include normative elements but 
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whose semantics is not the result of an explicit stipulation from end-to-
end). Let’s examine them.  
3.1. Descriptors 
International ISO norm 2788 for the establishment of monolingual 
thesauri, already quoted by Manuel Zacklad, defines them as  
 
“vocabulary of a controlled indexing language formally organized so as to 
make explicit a priori relations between notions (for instance, the generic-
specific relation).”  (Zacklad, 2007, p. 5) 
 
The first consequence of this definition – if indexing is all about giving 
an account of a document’s content – namely, the lack of referential 
relationship, provides indexers with the possibility to have recourse to an 
indefinite number of descriptors. These descriptors cannot therefore be in 
a one-to-one correspondence with subjects. The latter can however be 
apprehended through a bundle of notions drawn from a thesaurus.  
Thesauri consist in networks of a limited number of relations between 
their components (descriptors), including genericity, specificity and 
association as regards the main ones. In order to pick up a descriptor, it is 
necessary to spell out, upstream, all the connections it entertains with other 
descriptors, for descriptors only exist as far as they’re interwoven with 
each others in a controlled vocabulary which allocates a defining place to 
each and every one of them. Accordingly, the meaning of descriptors 
needs to be properly understood from an inferential point of view for 
relations like hyponymy, hyperonymy or synonymy only betoken the 
intrinsic order of the thesaurus.  
An obvious objection to this claim would no doubt be that descriptors 
are also supposed to denote concepts. However, Manuel Zacklad rightly 
underlines how much these concepts are in fact the direct expression of 
vernacular languages, a feat that is reflected through their intrinsic 
variability. Because it is difficult to isolate an autonomous conceptual 
level from its linguistic representation (or rather, from any linguistic 
expression), a shadow is thus cast on the real scope of the referential 
semantics traditionally ascribed to descriptors.  
 
One way to slightly alter this judgement would be to stress the 
difficulty to choose between several terms in order to represent a concept.  
Cf. Zacklad:  
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“the creators of a thesaurus will adopt a linguistic expression, the 
descriptor, and consider it, ceteris paribus, as the best surrogate of the 
intended concept” (Zacklad, 2007, p. 6) 
 
However, the exhibited similarities, relying on a semantic apparatus 
that includes synonymy and translation (intra-linguistic as well as inter 
linguistic), they finally, correspond to the much criticized notion of 
“meaning postulates”,  the one advocated by Rudolf Carnap in his book 
Meaning and Necessity, and famously criticized later on by his student, 
Willard Quine. (We lack space to further elaborate on the locus where 
inferential semantics, meaning postulates, and the principle of literary 
warrant in library sciences all collide). 
As regards tags, whereas relations are de facto established between 
them, contrary to descriptors, they’re never specified. 
Of course, this does not take into account systems which tap into 
thesauri to add more structure to a folksonomy. It could nonetheless be 
argued that label idiosyncrasies escape all attempt of regiment. Moreover, 
for the same reasons but from a referential point of view this time, the 
denotational status of label is an intractable question (cf. infra §3.4 sq.). 
3.2. Subject Headings 
A subject heading is no simple word. It is a compound lexical entity 
singled out from a documentary language – instead of a natural language. 
In other words, a syntagm created after the coordination of several 
descriptors. The distance between natural and artificial (documentary) 
languages is to be measured, on a semantic level, by the distance between 
the models (the model-theoretic sense of the word) used to clarify the 
meaning of the lexical items discussed. As Helen Svevonius (2000, 
chapter 8) noted, “subject language terms differ “referentially” from words 
used in ordinary language. The former do not refer to objects in the real 
world or concepts in a mentalistic world but to subjects. As a name of a 
subject, the term “Butterflies” refers not to actual butterflies but rather to 
the set of all indexed documents about butterflies” [my emphasis]. What is 
at stake in formal approaches to semantics is, amongst other things, what 
Emon Bach (1989) called the “natural language metaphysics”, a critical 
analysis of how linguistic components denote (to which entities they refer 
to). As regards subject headings, the putative domain of their model (the 
set of all the things they denote) is composed of documents about the same 
content; which share a common theme.  
 
The norm AFNOR NF Z 44-070 adds this:  
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Each subject heading corresponds to only one subject, simple or complex. 
One document can have more than one subject thus prompting the wording 
of a plurality of subject headings. (AFNOR, 1986) 
 
Beyond the well-known challenge raised by lexical entities to formal 
semantics, every attempt to interpret a language according to only one 
model is doomed to shed light on the design process behind the production 
of that language rather than on its effective use. Tags, on the other hand, 
are free from this limitation. One need only point at “to-do” tags (Bach, 
1999, Marlow et. al. 2006), traces of actions related in one way or another 
to resources without the need for them to denote them, to dismiss any 
attempt to equate subject headings and tags (labels).  
3.3. Keywords 
Admittedly, it is difficult if not altogether impossible to reach a 
consensual agreement regarding the definition of keywords. The very 
success of this notion comes with a high price to pay: unrestrained 
fuzziness. From “natural language” queries typical of search engines to 
keywords as defined in library sciences the gap seems almost 
preposterous. That is why only this well-established usage will be our 
concern for the time being. As the norm AFNOR NF Z 47-102 puts it, a 
keyword is a “word or group of words picked up either from the title and 
the main body of a document or from a document request, in order to 
describe its content”. A keyword, albeit bound by its origins to natural 
languages, is the result of a careful analysis of a written document. Tags, 
thanks to the versatility of the digital environment of the WWW, best 
characterized by the word “hypermedia”, are used with a variety of 
resources that far exceeds written documents from which keywords are 
extracted. For this simple reason, the label of a tag cannot be assimilated 
to a keyword. Huge as it is, the variety of written documents is nothing 
compared to that of tagged resources since the latter may indeed include 
photos, audio recordings or even real-world events as we shall see. Let’s 
go even further by noting that the impossibility to extract keywords from 
audio recordings (computerized metadata being another thing) or world 
events (the website “Upcoming.org”, for example, allows one to [machine] 
tag events) stands in sharp contrast with the main feature of tagging: the 
opportunity to add strings of characters to a resource, a resource being, 
according to the W3C “whatever might be identified by a URI” (RFC 
3986). A logic of expression, wherein content is added rather that parsed, 
takes over the one behind the definition of keywords. With the emphasis 
shifting solely from description towards expression, we also get the means 
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to distinguish “real tags” from fake ones. Those applications which quite 
spuriously pretend to produce tags from text analysis are in fact only able 
to extract keywords whereas tagging is, in a very large measure, 
tantamount to adding absent or rather extrinsic content to a resource.  
3.4. Labels as Blank Spaces 
The most striking contrast with previous existing bodies of practices 
and norms, from the point of view of professional indexers, must have 
been the shift from a priori, controlled indexing to the current freer forms. 
An immediate consequence of this newly acquired freedom, in a nutshell, 
is that labels are no longer terms of a thesaurus, subject headings, or even 
words, but all this at the same time and even much more than that, 
including, among other things: triple and/or machine tags, URLs, smileys 
(iconic representations in general), messages written in Windings, code, 
etc.  
Nothing prevents infusing a sign like “@” with an idiosyncratic 
meaning, to the extent that one fears not dwelling at the frontier of the 
idiolect and distance oneself with the received sociolect. Machine tags are 
another borderline case where machine-readable computer code, designed 
specifically in accordance with blue-ribbon Webservices, supplies human-
understandable information owing to an artificial syntax that mimics that 
of natural languages (those technological devices we qualified as 
“artefacts of meaning” are deeply teratological in nature from a linguistic 
point of view; they deeply alter our language games in a way previously 
inconceivable). 
If the freedom to choose one’s own labels that is now offered to users 
was to be properly acknowledged then there would remain only one 
conclusion to be drawn. Contrary to subject headings or descriptors whose 
semantics is rigidly established in line with a single model of 
interpretation or through a well-ordered lexicon – thanks to a small 
number of relations established and postulated in order to evacuate every 
remainder of ambiguity – labels written on tags are able to comprise 
various entities, linguistic or not, thus forbidding all global theorizing on 
the semantics behind their use. In other words, the label of a tag is a blank 
space that is fit to accommodate any sort of inscribable entities (as far as 
the system is made to be compliant.). As such, it is therefore completely 
devoid of any fixed semantics (such a question doesn’t even have a sense 
as regards tags understood exclusively as technological devices). 
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4. Resource Indeterminacy 
Rashmi Sinha (2005), in her widely quoted analysis of the cognitive 
dimensions of tagging, undertakes an explanation revolving around the 
idea that it constitutes a softening of categorizing, one whereby directories 
and their well-publicized shortcomings are no longer needed. According to 
Sinha, in order to make use of directories one has to pay a tremendous 
cognitive cost, an outlay that may be easily dispensed with thanks to the 
low-entry barrier of tagging. Of course, this is not to say that everyone by 
simply using tags is automatically rewarded with the skills of a 
professional indexer. Yet, indexing as an activity, now that it allows a 
higher rate of errors, redundancies, nonce words and hapaxes, is certainly 
made to suit, more so than any preceding comparable system before, the 
layman’s needs.  
 
Such a vision, though appealing, is nevertheless missing a fundamental 
element. In spite of its seeming simplicity, tagging hides a repeatedly 
overlooked difficulty. It has been painstakingly argued that tags instantiate 
relationships of reference and access (and many others but we’ve been 
only focusing on these two). Now it’s time to ask another question: to 
what? Real entities? Digital resources? Far from obvious, the answers to 
this question echo in a large measure those raised by dereferenceable URIs 
on an information network such as the WWW. The various forms of 
“aboutness” displayed by tags suggest the possibility that each of them 
corresponds to a different kind of entity.  
As regards those available on the Web, they qualify for a large part as 
“intentional artefacts” – to borrow a concept from Daniel Dennett (1990). 
The way we deal with such artefacts is unavoidably tainted by their 
aboutness. An image might be about something as well as a text or an 
audio recording. Hence, whenever a user is tagging an image for instance, 
he is at the same time asserting something about (and referring to) an 
entity located either on the Web and/or outside of the Web (the image per 
se vs. what it stands for), and leveraging the possibility to access it afresh 
at any time (the picture located on a given website where it has been 
allocated an identifier which is also – potentially – an address).  
This relation of access itself is just as indeterminate as any linguistic 
description. 
(In order to circumvent the phenomenon called deixis, the concept of 
«deferred ostension» is sometimes used to distinguish the index from the 
referent, pointing at from referring to. It follows from this perspective that 
“monstration” (to use a French word) is located halfway between 
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technological access and linguistic reference: an area where language 
embodies gestures – and extends as far as to incorporate tools and artefacts.) 
True, the resolution of a URI into a URL is the result of a controlled 
negotiation between agents dictated by the technical standards defined in 
protocols (most notably HTTP). Once a page (what exactly is a Webpage 
remains a difficult question.) has been generated though, the exact nature 
of what has been described thanks to the label of a tag remains open: is it 
the page itself, or a part of it? And which one? A blog post, a commentary 
or both? The hyperlink itself? An action that should be prompted by 
accessing something like a resource?   
We’ve already alluded to the intangible nature of resources. Strictly 
speaking, to be a resource is tantamount to being just about anything. Still, 
since only informational entities are available on the Web, a notion was 
eventually forged in order to single out a subclass of resources in a more 
explicit fashion; that of “information resources” (Halpin and Presutti, 
2009, 521-534). Information resources are described as resources which 
can be represented online (an information resource might be “the weather 
today”, its representation would then, for example, be a webpage 
generated at a given moment containing the daily weather report). The role 
of agents is, for each HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) request, to 
generate a representation in accordance with a set of technical parameters. 
Of course, agents have their say in determining the kind of representations 
the user of a tag is given access to. However, from her point of view, what 
the tag is able to retrieve is inescapably intermeshed with what the label of 
a tag refers to, except when the two strongly differ (a real-time event can 
hardly be taken for a webpage describing that event, while a given 
document can, ceteris paribus, undergo conversion from PDF to HTML or 
any other format that maintains its legibility without too much alteration).  
Hence, whenever access and reference are jointly associated, as is the 
case with tags, what the user may have access to (whenever tags play a 
pivotal role in her browsing) happens to be filtered by the labels she used 
when she referred to it (and in some cases it happens that access is given 
to just what a label refers to, for instance when the representation of a 
resource is indistinguishable from the resource itself; though a difference 
remains in principle which explains why reference may be made 
specifically to a resource and not to its representation, thus inducing more 
confusion – or  complexity, depending on one’s standpoint). 
Alexandre Monnin 
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5. Conclusion 
We postpone the examination of this question for further research, in 
the hope that a full blown inquiry into the hows and whys of this (at least) 
“bi-dimensionalist” (to distinguish it from two-dimensionalist approaches 
to meaning) approach to meaning, rooted in language, semiotics and 
technology, would help to identify and evaluate enough relevant case-
studies for a theory primer to emerge. Comparable phenomena of 
indeterminacy have been already identified in natural language use under 
the name of “systematic polysemy”. Yet, it remains to be seen whether or 
not lessons learnt from studying this issue are relevant – let alone 
transposable – when it comes to such artefacts of meaning as tagging 
systems. If technology is truly altering the rules of our languages games 
the task that is awaiting us is to honestly assess to what extent. 
